The two definitive statements of dual agency in the crucifixion
How the Molinist framework maps onto the crucifixion
This article presents the Molinist perspective. The Proof Text Explorer shows how Calvinism, Arminianism, Provisionism, and Molinism each interpret Acts 2:23 — side by side.
Free moral agents — not puppets — whose choices God foreknew through middle knowledge
Some Calvinists argue that prognōsis in Acts 2:23 means "fore-ordination" or "pre-planning" — God's foreknowledge is simply another way of describing His predetermined plan. On this reading, boulē and prognōsis are synonymous or nearly so, and the crucifixion was brought about by God's deterministic decree through compatibilist freedom.
This collapses the conjunction into a redundancy. If prognōsis means the same as boulē, then Peter is saying "by God's set plan and set plan" — a vacuous statement. The conjunction kai ("and") naturally links two distinct concepts.
Furthermore, prognōsis is transparently derived from proginōskō ("to know beforehand"), which is a cognitive term, not a volitional one. "To know" and "to plan" are different activities. Peter distinguishes them because they are distinct.
Even Calvin himself, in his commentary on Acts, read prognōsis as genuinely cognitive: "By foreknowledge, Luke means that the crucifixion did not take God by surprise — He knew it would happen. By plan, he means that God decreed it." Calvin distinguished the two terms, even though his broader theology tended to collapse foreknowledge into decree.
The Arminian reading takes prognōsis as simple foreknowledge of the actual future — God foresaw that the crucifixion would happen and incorporated it into His plan. This preserves human freedom but relies on God's bare prevision of future free acts.
Simple foreknowledge provides no providential leverage. If God merely foresaw that the crucifixion would happen (including all His own future actions), then His "plan" is not genuinely formative — it is merely a recognition of what will happen anyway.
The conjunction of boulē ("plan") and prognōsis ("foreknowledge") implies that the plan was formulated on the basis of the foreknowledge — that the foreknowledge informed the plan. But simple foreknowledge cannot inform a plan because it already includes the plan's effects.
Only middle knowledge — logically prior to the creative decree — can genuinely inform the plan.
Open theists deny that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of future free actions. On this reading, prognōsis refers to God's general knowledge of the situation — His awareness of the political dynamics, the characters of the agents, and the religious tensions — rather than specific foreknowledge of what free agents would do.
This trivializes Peter's statement. Peter is claiming something remarkable: that the crucifixion — the most shocking and seemingly contingent event in history — was the product of God's foreknowledge. If God merely had a general sense of how things might go, the claim loses its force.
Moreover, the conjunction with hōrismenē boulē ("set plan") implies certainty. God's plan was "set" — fixed, determined, settled. A set plan based on probabilistic guesses is not genuinely "set." Only a plan based on infallible foreknowledge can be genuinely fixed. Middle knowledge provides this; open theism does not.
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